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Abstract
Suppose that “uncertainty” about labor market conditions has increased. Does this change
induce an unemployed worker to search longer, or shorter? This paper shows that the answer
is drastically different depending on whether an increase in “uncertainty” is an increase in risk
or that in true uncertainty in the sense of Frank Knight. We show in a general framework
that, while an increase in risk (the mean-preserving spread of the wage distribution that
the worker thinks she faces) increases the reservation wage, an increase in the Knightian
uncertainty (a decrease in her confidence about the wage distribution) reduces it.
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1. Introduction
Consider an unemployed worker who is searching for a job. Suppose that “uncertainty”
about labor market conditions has increased. Does this change induce her to search longer and
more intensively, or shorter and less intensively? The answer to this question has utmost impor-
tance both in macroeconomics concerning the aggregate unemployment rate and microeconomics
explaining worker behavior. The purpose of this paper is to show that the answer is drastically
different depending on what kind of “uncertainty” is involved. If an increase in “uncertainty”
is an increase in the variance of the wage offer distribution that the worker thinks she faces, the
worker searches longer. If an increase in “uncertainty” is a decrease in her confidence about
the wage distribution, the worker searches shorter.
In the tradition of Frank Knight, the former type of “uncertainty,” which is reducible
to a single distribution with known parameters, is risk, while the latter type of “uncertainty,”
which is irreducible, is true uncertainty (see Knight, 1921, and also see Keynes, 1921, 1936).
While risk and uncertainty are clearly distinct concepts, they have not been treated separately in
economics in an explicit way, at least until recently. This may be because of the celebrated
theorem of Savage (Savage, 1954) which shows that if the decision maker’s behavior complies
to certain axioms, her preference is represented by the expectation of some utility function which
is computed by means of some single probability measure. Uncertainty that the decision maker
faces is thus reduced to risk with some probability measure. However, Ellsberg (1961) presented
an example of preference under uncertainty that cannot be justified by Savage’s expected utility
framework. The decision maker’s behavior described in Ellsberg’s paradox, which is not at all
irrational, clearly violates some of Savage’s axioms.
Gilboa (1987), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Schmeidler (1989) weaken Savage’s
axioms to settle debates caused by Ellsberg’s paradox. They axiomatize the preference which
is represented by the minimum among the expected utilities each of which is computed by an
element of some set of probability measures. This preference is called the maximin expected
utility or the Choquet expected utility. This is a natural extension of preference under uncertainty
to the case in which the information is too imprecise to summarize it by a single probability
measure. This type of uncertainty is called the Knightian uncertainty.2
This paper applies the idea of the Knightian uncertainty to the job search model, and
compare the effect of its increase on the worker’s search behavior with that of an increase in risk.
To this end, we extend the stylized model of job search without recall (see, for example, Sargent,
1987, p.66) by assuming that the unemployed worker’s preference is represented by the maximin
expected utility / Choquet expected utility axiomatized by the authors cited above. Since we
focus on the role of the Knightian uncertainty, we assume the time-consistent intertemporal
structure in the worker’s preference over time. Under these setting, we show that the optimal
stopping rule exists, that this optimal stopping rule has a reservation property, and that the
reservation wage is characterized by a functional equation.
Then, we exploit the functional equation determining the reservation wage to examine
the effect of an increase in the Knightian uncertainty. In the traditional framework where
uncertainty is specified by a single probability distribution, an increase in uncertainty, that is,
an increase in risk, is modeled by a mean-preserving spread of the given distribution. Then,
it turns out that the mean-preserving spread, that is, an increase in risk, causes an increase in
the reservation wage (see Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970, 1971, or Section 2.1 of this paper).
Thus, the unemployed worker is inclined to keep searching for a job when risk has increased.
In contrast, we formulate the Knightian uncertainty in such a way that the worker does not
have confidence that a given wage distribution is the true one, and that instead she assumes
a set of probability distributions and maximizes the minimum of expected utilities based on
each probability distribution. We then show that the reservation wage is decreased when the
Knightian uncertainty increases, and hence, the worker tends to accept the job offer more quickly.
This result conforms our intuition that, when people lose confidence in their forecast about what
happens in the future, they generally prefer certainty to uncertainty. An immediate acceptance
of the wage offer implies that the uncertainty is turned into certainty.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the main result of this
paper by using a simple example based on the uniform distribution of the wage offer. Technical
discussions are kept at the minimum in this section. Section 3 bridges non-technical Section
2 and technical Section 4 in explaining the maximin expected utility, Choquet expected utility,
and some continuity problems which must be solved. Section 4 presents the main result in3
a general framework. This section also explains how the result of Section 2 is derived from
the general framework. Proofs of the main theorems of Section 4 are relegated to Section 5.
The definitions and some mathematical results about the Choquet capacity, which are extensively
utilized in Section 4, are collected in the Appendix. Any lemma in the Appendix will be referred
to as Lemma A .
2. An Example: Risk versus Knightian Uncertainty
Let us first consider a simple job search model (for example, see a stylized example of
Sargent, 1987, p.66). In each period, an unemployed worker draws a wage offer, from a wage
distribution1 F0. The worker is assumed to know the true distribution F0. If the unemployed
worker accepts the offer, he earns that wage from this period on. If he decides not to, he gets
unemployment compensation, c 0, in this period2 and will make a draw again in the next
period. Let T denote the period that the worker accepts the wage offer. The unemployed
worker’s objective is, by choosing a suitable stopping rule, to maximize his expected life-time
income
E0
∞
∑
t 0
β tyt
where
yt
c for t T
wT for t T
Under general conditions on F0, (1) there exists the optimal stopping rule and (2) the stopping
rule has a reservation property. That is, the optimal stopping rule is to accept the wage offer if
it is no smaller than the reservation wage R and to wait for another offer if otherwise, where the
reservation wage R is determined by a choice between accepting this period’s offer or waiting
for next period’s offer:3
R c
β
1 β
Z ∞
R
1 F0 x dx (1)
1F0 x denotes the probability that the wage offer is no greater than x.
2The basic structure of the model is unchanged if instead we assume that the unemployed worker pays a search
cost, rather than he gets an unemployment compensation. In the case of the search cost, we have c 0.
3Eq 1 is easily derived from Corollary 2 in Section 4.4 as a special case.4
If we further specify the wage distribution to be a uniform distribution over a b where
0 a b, we have an explicit solution of the reservation wage. We further assume that
b c because otherwise continuing the search forever would be trivially optimal, and that the
parameters of the model satisfy the following conditions:
b a β 2c a b (2)
and 2 c a β 2c a b (3)
to assure that R a b holds. Then by 1 ,w eh a v e
R c
β
1 β
Z b
R
b x
b a
dx c
β b R 2
2 1 β b a
(4)
By solving this quadratic equation, we get4
R
1
β
b 1 β a D1 2 (5)
where D 1 β b a b a β 2c a b
2.1. Increased Risk: Mean-preserving Spread
Suppose that “uncertainty” over wage offers is slightly increased for the worker. In the
above example, the wage distribution may be slightly more dispersed by γ , over a γ b γ .
S e eF i g u r e1 ,w h e r eF0 (the dotted line) is the probability distribution function of the uniform
distribution over a b and the solid line is the one of the new uniform distribution over
a γ b γ . This is a mean-preserving spread, characterizing increased risk (see, Rothschild and
Stiglitz, 1970). If this is the case, 4 is modified to
R c
β b γ R 2
2 1 β b a 2γ
(6)
4Let us conjecture that R a b in order to derive 4 from 1 . W et h e nv e r i f yt h a tt h er e s e r v a t i o nw a g eR
thus derived in 5 certainly satisfies this condition under 2 and 3 .
First, note that D 0b yb a and by 2 . Second, note that the conjugate solution to the quadratic equation
4 :
R
1
β
³
b 1 β a D1 2
´
violates the condition because R b by D 0 and by the fact that 1 β b 1 β a b, which is equivalent to
1 β b a 0. Third, note that we have R b s i n c ew eg e tR b if and only if b c, which holds under our
assumption. Finally, note that R a because R a i fa n do n l yi f2c a β 2c a b ,w h i c hh o l d ss i n c ew e
have 3 . The conjecture is thus verified.5
Denote the solution R to this equation by R γ as a function of γ . Then, the implicit function
theorem shows that
dR γ
dγ γ 0
β b R R a
b a 1 β b a β b R
where R in the right-hand side is given by 5 .S i n c ea R b by 2 and 3 ,
dR γ
dγ γ 0
0
This result shows that increased “uncertainty” in the form of increased risk (a mean-preserving
spread) increases the reservation wage.
2.2. Increased Knightian Uncertainty: δ -Approximation of ε -Contamination
In the case of the mean-preserving spread, the worker is still certain of the shape of the
wage distribution. It is a uniform distribution a γ b γ , spreading out the original distribution
by exactly γ . The worker has firm confidence about the new wage distribution.
In reality, however, the worker may not have such firm confidence on the wage distri-
bution when economic conditions are changed. The worker may become uncertain about the
shape of the wage distribution itself. The wage distribution may be different from the uniform
distribution over a b with a positive (though small) probability. Moreover, the worker may
have no idea about the shape of the wage distribution if in fact it is different. It may still
be uniform and spreading out by γ ( a γ b γ ), but the worker does not have any confidence
about the value of γ . It may be wildly different from uniform distribution. This “uncertainty”
that the worker faces clearly cannot be reduced to a change in parameters of known distribution.
Thus, the “uncertainty” here is the Knightian uncertainty.
The problem that the worker faces is similar to that of a Bayesian statistician who con-
fronts “uncertainty” in a prior distribution of the Bayesian learning process. One procedure that
the Bayesian statistician often follows is to introduce a set of priors obtained by “contaminating”
a single hypothetical prior and then to investigate the robustness of the learning process. This
procedure is often called as ε -contamination.5 We follow this Bayesian tradition in formulating
the Knightian uncertainty by “contaminating” the original wage distribution.
5See, for example, Berger (1985) and Wasserman and Kadane (1990). For the use of ε -contamination in economics,
see Epstein and Wang (1994, 1995).6
We formulate the worker’s problem in three steps. Firstly, following the ε -contamination
literature, we specify the uncertainty that the worker faces by a set of distributions, rather than by
a single distribution in the traditional framework. Secondly, we postulate an appropriate optimal
search problem of the worker facing this multi-distribution uncertainty, using the framework of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Thirdly, we examine whether the optimal strategy has the
reservation wage property and if it has, whether increased uncertainty increases the reservation
wage.
In order to follow the ε -contamination literature, we need to be a bit formalistic. Let
W be a Borel subset of and W be the Borel σ -algebra on W.L e tP0 be the probability
measure on W corresponding to F0. In our example, W is a b ,a n dP0 is the uniform
distribution over a b .L e t be the set of all probability measures on W and let ε 0.
In our example, is the set of all probability measures corresponding to distributions over
a b .T h e n ,ε -contamination of the original distribution is the set of probability measures on W
defined by
0 1 ε P0 εµ µ (7)
In fact, if ε 0, then 0 P0 , and the problem is reduced to the traditional search one. An
increase in ε implies that the worker becomes less certain that P0 is in fact the true distribution.
Thus, an increase in ε can be interpreted as an increase in the Knightian uncertainty.6
There is, however, one technical problem in the above formulation. This formulation
implies that the value of inf P A P 0 changes discontinuously at A W when A approaches
W (an illustrative example is given below in Figures 2 and 3), and this discontinuity makes dy-
namic analysis of this paper much complicated mathematically with no further economic insights
(see Section 3.2). To avoid this mathematical problem, we use in this section the following
δ -approximation of ε -contamination.
Let δ be a small positive number, and let P0 δ be
P0 δ µ A δµ A P0 A
6The formal definition of more Knightian uncertainty is given in Section 4.5.7
The δ -approximation of ε -contamination, δ ,i sd e f i n e db y
δ 1 ε P0 εµ µ P0 δ (8)
Note that P0 0 . Thus, by appropriately choosing a small δ we can approximate 0
by δ as close as we want.
The ε -contamination and its δ -approximation are best explained in our uniform-distri-
bution example by Figures 2 and 3. In our example, we have W a b . In Figure 2, the
ε -contamination of P0, 0, is given by the set of all probability distribution functions above
1 ε F0 and below 1 ε F0 ε for all x a b .7 It is evident from this figure that
inf P a x P 0 is equal to 1 ε F0 x for all x a b , and that we have inf P a x P
0 1a tx b.T h u s , i n f P a x P 0 becomes discontinuous at x b.I n F i g u r e 3 , t h e
δ -approximation of ε -contamination of P0, δ , is given by the set of all probability distribution
functions which are (i) above 1 ε F0 for x a y and above 1 ε F0 ε F0 1 δ 1
for x y b ,w h e r eF0 y 1 δ , and (ii) below 1 ε F0 ε F0 δ for x a z and below
1 ε F0 ε for x z b ,w h e r eF0 z δ .8 It is evident by construction that inf P a x P
δ is continuous for all x a b , whereas inf P a x P 0 is discontinuous at x b.
The figures also show that the δ -approximation of ε -contamination, δ , expands toward the
ε -contamination, 0,a sδ decreases, and that we can “approximate” the latter by the former as
close as possible by appropriately choosing a small δ .
To concentrate our attention on the Knightian uncertainty itself, we assume that the
unemployed worker faces the same uncertainty characterized by δ in each period. That is, we
assume that the observation of the wage offer does not affect the future uncertainty. Thus,
we do not consider explicitly the worker’s learning about the uncertainty. This assumption is
7From 7 , we get the following alternative expression for 0:
0 P A P A 1 ε P0 A
From this expression, we immediately know that there is a lower bound for P as described in Figure 2.
Moreover, the inequality in the definition must hold for the complement of A. This implies that there is also an
upper bound for P , as described in this figure.
8From 8 , we get the following alternative expressions for δ :
δ P A P A 1 ε P0 A if P0 A 1 δ ;a n d
P A 1 ε P0 A ε P0 A 1 δ 1 if P0 A 1 δ
We get the lower bound of P A in Figure 3 immediately from this expression. The upper bound of P A is
obtained by substituting for A its complement in the above formula.8
a reasonable one for the Knightian uncertainty. If the uncertainty were specified by a single
distribution of some distribution family with an unknown parameter, say, a normal distribution
with an unknown mean and a known variance, some updating procedure together with a conjugate
prior over the parameter space would be used to detect the true value of the unknown parameter
(see DeGroot, 1970 and Rothschild, 1974). In contrast to this case, the worker here does not
know even the type of the true distribution, let alone its parameters (recall that a distribution in
δ can be a member of any of uncountably many parametric families). The uncertainty that the
worker faces is much broader and deeper. In fact, it is shown that a commonly-used update
rule may not resolve the Knightian uncertainty at all in some cases.9
Since the Knightian uncertainty is now defined by a set δ of distributions rather than
a single distribution, we must redefine the objective function accordingly. We postulate that the
unemployed worker’s objective is to maximize the minimum of his expected discounted future
income
min
Z
W
I w dP w P δ (9)
where I w is the discounted future income which is a bounded measurable function of the
observed offer w.10 The exact formula I w is complicated and shown in Section 4.2 so that it
is not shown here. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) show that if the worker’s behavior complies
to certain axioms, his objective function is in fact representable by an expression similar to 9 .
Thus, our formulation is consistent with theirs.11
Under these settings we can show (see Section 4) that (1) there exists the optimal
stopping rule and (2) the optimal stopping rule has a reservation property. Furthermore, it turns
9We could incorporate explicitly some updating rule which is adopted for the Knightian uncertainty. Nishimura
and Ozaki (2001) use the Dempster-Shafer rule, which is given some axiomatic foundation by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1993), to show that there are cases in which the adoption of the Dempster-Shafer rule does not resolve at all the
uncertainty characterized by 0.
10The minimum is attained since I is assumed to be bounded and measurable, and δ is weak * compact by the
Alaoglu theorem.
11They employ a mixture space as a prize space and show that if the decision maker’s behavior complies to certain
axioms, his objective function is represented by
min
½ Z
W
u I w dP w
¯
¯
¯ ¯ P
¾
(10)
for some weak * closed convex set of probability charges (for the definition of the probability charge, see the
Appendix) and for some utility index u which is unique up to a positive affine transformation.9
out that R is characterized as the solution to the following equation for sufficiently small ε 0
and δ 0:
R c
β
1 β
Z ∞
R
1 ε P0 w w x dx
c
β
1 β
1 ε
Z ∞
R
P0 w w x dx
c
β 1 ε b R 2
2 1 β b a
(11)
(see right after Corollary 2 in Section 4.4). By solving this equation, we can write R as R ε
as a function of ε . The implicit function theorem shows that
dR ε
dε ε 0
β b R 2
2 1 β b a 2β b R
where R in the right-hand side is given by 5 .S i n c eR b by 2 and 3 ,
dR ε
dε ε 0
0
which shows that an increase in the Knightian uncertainty, specified by an increase in ε ,
decreases the reservation wage.12 This is exactly the opposite to an increase in risk, specified by
an increase in γ . As we already mentioned in the Introduction, this makes sense economically.
When they become less confident in what happens in the future, people may prefer “certainty”
much more to “uncertainty.” The uncertainty is resolved immediately when the worker accepts
the wage offer. Hence, an increase in the Knightian uncertainty is likely to persuade the worker
to cancel a further search.
Section 4 extends this example to a more general setting and show that qualitatively the
same result holds even in the general case.
3. Some Technical Issues
Before proceeding with a formal analysis of Section 4, we deal in this section with two
technical issues concerning dynamical analysis. In Section 4, we assume the objective function
is intertemporally well-defined. Preferences need to be “continuous” for this property to hold.
12A similar result holds globally, not only locally. See right after Theorem 2 in Section 4.5.10
The maximin preferences illustrated by the Example in the previous section are not well-suited
for the characterization of this continuity requirement. Thus in Section 3.1, we reformulate
preferences as those represented by a Choquet integral with a convex probability capacity. In
Section 3.2, we explain problems that may arise if the capacity is not continuous in the Choquet-
integral-cum-probability-capacity formulation. We thus impose the continuity assumption directly
on the probability capacity.
3.1. Representation by Choquet Integral with Convex Capacity
In this section, we use probability capacity, Choquet integral and other related concepts,
w h i c ha r ee x p l a i n e di nt h eA p p e n d i x . L e tP0 be the probability measure corresponding to
the uniform distribution over a b as in Section 2.2. Let ε 0a n dδ 0. Then, define
θ δ : W 0 1 by
A θ δ A
1 ε P0 A if P0 A 1 δ
1 ε P0 A ε P0 A 1 δ 1 if P0 A 1 δ
(12)
Then, Lemma A1 in the Appendix shows that θ δ is a convex probability capacity. Furthermore,
it turns out that the core of θ δ satisfies core θ δ δ . Therefore, it follows that
I
Z
W
I w dθ δ w min
Z
W
I w dP w P core θ δ
min
Z
W
I w dP w P δ
where the integral in the left-hand side of the above relations is the Choquet integral. The
first equality of the above relations holds by Lemma A8 in the Appendix. This shows that the
maximin preferences given by 9 are identical to the preferences which are represented by the
Choquet integral with the convex capacity 12 .
Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989) show that if the worker’s behavior complies to
certain axioms, his objective function is in fact representable by a Choquet integral with some
convex probability capacity. Thus, our formulation is consistent with theirs.13
For mathematical tractability (see Section 3.2), we formulate a general search model
under the Knightian uncertainty in the next section with preferences represented by a Choquet
13Gilboa (1987) employs a general prize space and Schmeidler (1989) employs a mixture space as a prize space,
and they show that if the decision maker’s behavior complies to certain axioms, his objective function is represented11
integral with a convex probability capacity. It should, however, be kept in mind that we lose
some mathematical generality by this procedure, though not much in economics. In particular,
although the maximin representation and the Choquet representation of the preference coincide
exactly for the case of the δ -approximation of ε -contamination, they are not always so. In
fact, while the preferences represented by a Choquet integral with a convex capacity is a proper
subset of the maximin preferences, the converse is not necessarily true.14
3.2. Problems with Non-Continuous Capacity
The convex capacity which is not continuous poses technical difficulty in a dynamic
context. To see this point, let us consider the capacity θ 0 corresponding to the original
ε -contamination.15 It can be shown that θ 0 is not continuous.16 Let I w¡ w denote the
discounted future income when the wage offer w¡ has been observed today and the wage offer
w will be observed tomorrow. Then, it turns out that
Z
W
I w¡ w dθ 0 w 1 ε
Z
W
I w¡ w dP 0 w ε inf
w2W
I w¡ w (14)
by
Z
W
u I w dθ w (13)
for some convex probability capacity θ and for some utility index u which is unique up to a positive affine
transformation.
14By Lemma A8, 13 is always reduced to 10 . This footnote discusses that the converse is not necessarily true.
Let be an arbitrary weak * closed convex set of probability charges. If there exists a convex capacity θ with
which the Choquet integral is identical to 10 with this , it must be that A θ A inf inf P A P (let
I be the indicator function of a set A). Therefore, we need to have that inf be convex and that core inf .
However, the latter equality may not hold and inf may not even be convex. (See Huber and Strassen, 1973, for
both counter-examples.)
15The convex capacity θ 0 is defined by
A θ 0 A
8
<
:
1 ε P0 A if A W
1i f A W
and it holds that core θ 0 0 ( in the definition of 0 is now understood to be the set of all probability charges,
rather than probability measures).
16To see this, consider the increasing sequence of sets, Wn n, each of which is not equal to W a n ds u c ht h a t
nWn W. Such a sequence exists, for example, when W is an open interval.
It should be noted that θ 0 satisfies some weaker continuity requirement on the capacity defined on the Borel
σ -algebra. If this weaker continuity requirement is satisfied, 15 below turns out to be analytic in w . Analyticity
is a weaker property than measurability. To handle analytic functions, much more mathematical sophistication is
required than to handle measurable functions. Epstein and Wang (1995) refer to Dellacherie and Meyer (1988) to
cope with analytic functions in a dynamic asset pricing model.12
For the unemployed worker’s objective function is well-defined over time, 14 must be measur-
able in w¡ today because yesterday the worker had computed the expectation of 14 over w¡.
However, it is well-known that infw2W I w¡ w is not necessarily measurable in w¡ even if I is
measurable jointly in w¡ w . More generally, the Choquet integral
Z
W
I w¡ w dθ w (15)
is not necessarily measurable in w¡ unless θ is continuous.
Although θ 0 is not continuous, Lemma A1 shows that θ δ defined by 12 is continuous.
Note that 15 is always measurable in w¡ when the capacity is continuous by the Fubini
property (Lemma A13). Thus, the worker’s objective is well-defined in this case. This is
why we use the δ -approximation of the ε -contamination in the previous section, instead of the
ε -contamination.
One mathematical advantage to formulate preferences with a Choquet integral with a
convex capacity, rather than maximin preferences, is that we can impose the continuity assumption
directly on the primitive of the model by assuming that the capacity is continuous. This
procedure greatly simplifies formal dynamic analysis without losing any economic insights.
4. The Formal Model
4.1. Stochastic Environment
Let W W be a measurable space, where W is a Borel subset of and W is the
Borel σ -algebra on W. We regard each element w W as an offer of wage in each single-
period. For any t 0, we construct the t-dimensional product measurable space Wt
W t (we let
W 0 φ W ∞ ) and embed it in the infinite-dimensional product measurable space W ∞
W ∞
in a usual manner.17 We write a history of realized offers as 1wt w1 w2 wt Wt,
1w w1 w2 W ∞ ,a n ds oo n .
17More precisely, the construction is as follows: First, let W∞ W W be the countably-infinite-dimensional
Cartesian product of W,a n dl e tWt W W be the t-dimensional Cartesian product of W.T h a ti s ,W∞ is the
set of infinite sequences w1 w2 ,a n dWt is the set of finite sequences w1 wt ,w h e r e i wi W. Second,
let W ∞ be the σ -algebra on W ∞ generated by the family of sets of the form E1 E2 ,a n dl e t (W t) be the
σ -algebra on Wt generated by the family of sets of the form E1 Et, where for each i, Ei W,t h a ti s ,Ei is
a Borel set. Since W is a separable metric space, (W t) is identical to W
t
W W,t h et-dimensional13
Let θ be a capacitary kernel,t h a ti s ,l e tθ :W W 0 1 be a function such that
w W θ w is a probability capacity on W W and
B W θ ¢ B is W-measurable.
Throughout the paper, we assume that w θ w is convex and continuous. We specify
the uncertainty about the offer of the next period when the current wage offer is w by the core
of θ w. That is, we assume that the offer in each period is ‘distributed’ in a Markovian manner
according to core θ w . While we now allow that the uncertainty is Markovian, we still retain
the assumption of no learning as in Section 2.2 by restricting θ to be time-homogeneous. To
incorporate a reasonable learning process into the case of the Markovian-Knightian uncertainty is
an important agenda of future research.
4.2. Objective Function
An income process 0y y0 y1 y2 is a -valued stochastic process which is Wt -
adapted, that is, which satisfies t 0 yt is Wt-measurable. Given an income process 0y,w e
denote the continuation of 0y after the realization of a history 1wt by ty
1wt :
ty
1wt yt 1wt yt 1wt yt 1wt
Obviously, the continuation ty
1wt is W t -adapted given 1wt.
Given any adapted income process 0y a n da ni n i t i a lw a g eo f f e rw0 W,w ed e f i n et h e
product measurable space of W. Third and finally, define the σ -algebra ˆ
W t on W∞ (not on Wt)a st h eσ -algebra
generated by the family of cylinder sets E1 Et W W ,w h e r e i Ei is a Borel set. In particular,
ˆ
W 0 φ W∞ represents no information. Then, any function defined on W ∞ which is ˆ
W t-measurable takes on
the same value given the realization of w1 wt regardless of the realization of wt+1 wt+2 , and hence, it can
be identified with the function defined on (Wt). Exactly in this manner, we can embed (W t) in ˆ
W t. Therefore,
we do not distinguish these two objects and use the notation W t to represent both. This convention is convenient
when we consider stopping rules which is defined on W ∞ .14
lifetime expected income Iw0 0y by18
Iw0 0y lim
T!∞
y0 β
Z
W
y1 β
Z
W
y2 β
Z
W
yT θ dwT θ dw2 θ w0 dw1 (16)
where β 0 1 is the discount factor and
R
W dθ is the Choquet integral with respect to a
capacitary kernel θ . Note that each element of the sequence defining I is well-defined by the
continuity of θ and by the Fubini property (Lemma A13), and that the limit exists (allowing
∞ ) since the sequence is non-decreasing by the nonnegativity of yt’ sa n db yL e m m aA 4 .
Furthermore, θ ’s continuity and the monotone convergence theorem (Lemma A12) imply that
0y w0 Iw0 0y y0 β
Z
W
Iw1 1y w1 θ w0 dw1
which is called Koopmans’ equation.
When it happens to be the case that θ is a stochastic kernel, Eq 16 is reduced to
Iw0 0y lim
T!∞
y0 β
Z
W
y1 β
Z
W
y2 β
Z
W
yT dθ dθ dθ w0
lim
T!∞
y0 β
Z
W
y1dθ w0 β 2
Z
W
Z
W
y2dθ dθ w0
β T
Z
W
Z
W
Z
W
yT dθ dθ dθ w0
Ew0
∞
∑
t 0
β tyt
where the expectation operator E in the last line is taken with respect to the infinite-dimensional
product probability measure constructed from θ .W h e nθ is not a stochastic kernel, the second
equality may not hold since yt and
R
W yt 1θ dwt 1 may not be co-monotonic (see Lemmas A7
and A9), and the third equality may not hold since the ‘product capacity’ is not well-defined
uniquely.19
18In Eq 16 , we suppressed the arguments of the integrand. If we did not, it would be
Iw0 0y
lim
T ∞
y0 β
Z
W
µ
y1 w1 β
Z
W
µ
y2 w1 w2 β
Z
W
yT 1wT θ wT¡1 dwT
¶
θ w1 dw2
¶
θ w0 dw1
Here, the t-th integral from the most inside is a function of w1 wT t . Then, the whole integral is a real
number since w0 is given. This definition implies that the randomness will be aggregated backward from the future
to the current period one by one in each period.
19Let X and Y be two measurable spaces, let Z X Y be the product measurable space,
and let µ and ν be a capacity on and , respectively. Consider a capacity σ on which satisfies
S T σ S T µ S ν T15
4.3. Stopping Rule and Optimization Problem
Each period the prospective worker is given an offer w. Upon observing the value of
w, she has two alternatives, to accept it or to reject it. If she accepts the offer, she will obtain
w each period from that period on; if she rejects the offer, she will get the unemployment
compensation c 0 that period and will be given a random offer again in the next period.
A 0 1 2 ∞ -valued random variable δ on W ∞
W ∞ is called a stopping rule
if it satisfies
t 0 1 2 δ t Wt
where δ t abbreviates 1w δ 1w t . We allow δ to be ∞ for some history. We
denote the set of all stopping rules by ∆ . Given any stopping rule δ ∆ , define a process
0yδ yδ
0 yδ
1 yδ
2 by
t 0 yδ
t
c if δ t
wT if δ T T 0 1 t
Lemma 1 (Section 5) shows that 0yδ is W t -adapted, and hence it is actually an income
process. Given an initial wage offer w0 W, we denote the lifetime expected income under a
stopping rule δ ∆ by the symbol I for notational simplicity (there should be no confusion
about this):
Iw0 δ Iw0 0yδ
Similarly, given any t 1a n da n yh i s t o r y1wt Wt, we denote the income under δ ∆ after
the realization of 1wt by Iwt δ
1wt ,t h a ti s ,
Iwt δ
1wt Iwt tyδ
1wt
where tyδ
1wt is the continuation of yδ after the realization of 1wt as is defined in Section 4.2.
Lemma 2 (Section 5) proves that
Iw0 δ
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z
Iw1 δ w1 dθ w0 χ fδ 0g (17)
If both of µ and ν are probability charges, such a product capacity σ is uniquely determined. However, if at least
one of them is not additive, there could be many capacities which satisfy the above relation. This implies that
the ‘product capacity’ cannot be determined uniquely from the ‘marginal capacity.’ For more details, see Ghirardato
(1997).16
Here, χ denotes the indicator function on W ∞ .20 Eq 17 is Koopmans’ equation for a stopping
rule δ .
As t o p p i n gr u l eδ ∆ is optimal from w0 if
δ argmax Iw0 δ δ ∆
A stopping rule δ is admissible if it dictates more search as long as the observed offer is strictly
less than c. Any stopping rule which is not admissible is suboptimal since it is dominated by
the stopping rule which never stops, and hence, it can be safely ignored. When an optimal
stopping rule exists, we define the value function V ¤ :W by
w W V ¤ w Iw δ ¤
w
where we denote an optimal stopping rule from w by δ ¤
w.
4.4. Existence and Characterization of Optimal Stopping Rule
Given random variables w, w0, , wt,l e tc w and t
i 0wi denote the random variables
d e f i n e db ym a xc w and max w1 wt . Throughout the rest of this paper, we assume that
the primitives of the model satisfy the following two conditions:
E1. w0 t 0 Wt w0
Z Z
c t
i 0wi θ 0 dwt θ 0
w0 dw1 ∞
E2. w0 limt!∞ Wt w0
1 t β ¡1
where θ 0 is the conjugate of θ . The integrand in E1, c t
i 0wi, is the overly optimistic income
the worker expects in time t. This is overly optimistic because it is the highest offer up to time
t (our model is on search without recall). The integral in E1 is its overly optimistic ‘expectation’
evaluated at time 0. This is overly optimistic because it is evaluated by the conjugate of θ rather
20For example,
χ δ =t
(
1i fω δ t , i.e., δ ω t
0i fω δ t , i.e., δ ω t
Since δ is a stopping rule, χ δ =t and χ δ t are W t-measurable.17
than θ itself.21 E 1a s s u m e st h a tt h i si sf i n i t ef o ra n yt. This optimistic ‘expected’ income, Wt,
grows as t increases since it takes the maximum offer up to time t. The left-hand-side of E2
defines the time-average of the rate of growth in Wt. Hence, E2 as a whole assumes that this
time-average is lower than the worker’s impatience. When E2 holds, the effect caused by the
high income in a far future can be safely ignored since the worker’s impatience dominates the
income growth along any optimistic path. This is an analogue to the condition for the dynamic
programming technique introduced in Ozaki and Streufert (1996). If θ is simply a probability
measure, the left-hand side of E2 is 1 as long as the expectation of w is finite (Chung, 1974,
p.49), and hence, E2 is automatically satisfied.
Define a (constant) function V ¡ : W by w V ¡ w c 1 β and a function
V :W by w0
V w0 lim
T!∞
c w0 β
Z
c 1
i 0wi β
Z
c T
i 0wi θ dwT θ w0 dw1
which is a well-defined W-measurable function (let yT c T
i 0wi in Eq 16 ). Clearly,
V ¡ V , and Lemma 3 (Section 5) shows that w0 V w0 ∞ .
A W-measurable function V :W is admissible if it satisfies V ¡ V V .N o t e
that for any admissible stopping rule δ , I¢ δ is admissible. Let be the space of all admissible
functions from W into ,a n dl e tB be the operator from into itself defined by
V w W BV w max
w
1 β
c β
Z
W
V w0 θ w dw0 (18)
Lemma 4 (Section 5) shows that BV is admissible for any admissible function V, and hence,
that B is well-defined.
A function V is said to solve Bellman’s equation if BV V.W e t h e n h a v e t h e
main result of this paper, summarized in the following theorem. The proof of this theorem and
those of other theorems and corollaries are relegated to Section 5.
Theorem 1. The value function V ¤ exists and is the unique admissible solution to Bellman’s
equation. Furthermore, V ¤ is attained by the stopping rule δ ¤ such that for all t 0, δ ¤ t
21When we prove that the solution to Bellman’s equation (specified later) is the value function, we apply the
method of “squeezing” (see Lemma 6 in Section 5). In order to “squeeze”, we need to bound the increment by the
Choquet integral with respect to the conjugate (Lemma A11). This is why we need to define the ‘expected’ income
via the conjugate capacity in E1.18
as soon as
wt
1 β
c β
Z
W
V ¤ wt 1 θ wt dwt 1
holds; and δ ¤ to t h e r w i s e .
Let R :W be a W-measurable function defined by
w R w 1 β c β
Z
W
V ¤ w0 θ w dw0
We call R w reservation wage at a state w,t h a ti s ,w h e nw is observed. We say that the
capacitary kernel θ is monotonic if for any weakly increasing function y :W and for any
x 0,
w0 w θ w0 y x θ w y x
The next result is an extension of Lippman and MaCall (1976, Theorem 1).
Corollary 1. If θ is monotonic, then R is weakly increasing in w.
The next result further characterizes the reservation wage when the capacitary kernel θ
is i.i.d.,t h a ti s ,w h e nθ is independent of the current wage offer w.
Corollary 2. If the capacitary kernel θ is independent of the current wage offer, then the
reservation wage R w will be constant and is given by the solution R to the next equation:
R c
β
1 β
Z ∞
R
θ w w x dx
c
β
1 β
Z ∞
R
1 Fθ 0 x dx
where Fθ 0 is the “distribution” of θ 0 defined by Fθ 0 x θ 0 w w x .
As an application of Corollary 2, we show that 11 characterizes the reservation wage for
sufficiently small ε and δ in the Example of the δ -approximation of ε -contamination provided
in Section 2.2. First, let ε 0 be small enough to be such that R ε a where R ε is the19
solution to 11 .T h i si sp o s s i b l es i n c eR is continuous and R 0 a by 2 and 3 . Second,
let δ 0 be small enough to be such that a b a δ R ε .T h i si sp o s s i b l es i n c eR ε a.
Third, note that for any R a b a δ ,i th o l d st h a t
c
β
1 β
Z ∞
R
θ δ w w x dx c
β
1 β
Z ∞
R
1 ε P0 w w x dx
by the definition of θ δ . Finally, note that
R ε c
β
1 β
Z ∞
R ε
θ δ w w x dx (19)
This holds because R ε solves 11 and becasue R ε a b a δ . Therefore, the continuity
of θ δ , Corollary 2 and 19 imply that R ε in ( 11 ) is certainly the reservation wage.
4.5. Increase in Uncertainty
Let θ 1 and θ 2 be two capacitary kernels. According to Epstein and Zhang (1999), we
say that θ 2 represents more Knightian uncertainty than θ 1 if there exists a weakly increasing,
surjective and convex function g : 0 1 0 1 such that
w B θ 2
w B g θ 1
w B
It immediately follows that if θ 1
w is convex and continuous for each w, which we henceforth
assume, and if θ 2 represents more Knightian uncertainty than θ 1,t h e nθ 2
w is also convex and
continuous for each w. It also follows that if θ 2 represents more Knightian uncertainty than θ 1,
then
w core θ 2
w core θ 1
w (20)
which justifies our definition of more Knightian uncertainty22.L e tR1 and R2 b ear e s e r v a t i o n
wage of an unemployed worker with θ 1 and θ 2, respectively. The next result shows that the
reservation wage decreases if the Knightian uncertainty increases.
Theorem 2. If θ 2 represents more Knightian uncertainty than θ 1,t h e n w R2 w R1 w .
22For further motivation of this definition of more Knightian uncertainty, see Epstein and Zhang (1999, Theorem
3.1).20
As an application of Theorem 2, we show that an increase in ε decreases the reservation
wage for any δ 0 in the Example of the δ -approximation of ε -contamination provided in
Section 2.2. (Recall that we made only a local analysis there.) Let δ 0a n dl e tε 2 ε 1 0.
Write δ explicitly as ε
δ to denote its dependence on ε . Finally, suppose that θ i
δ is the
probability capacity corresponding to ε i
δ . Then, it turns out that
A θ 2
δ A
1 ε 2
1 ε 1
θ 1
δ A if θ 1
δ A 1 ε 1 1 δ
δ ε 2δ ε 2
δ ε 1δ ε 1
θ 1
δ A
ε 2 ε 1 1 δ
δ ε 1δ ε 1
if θ 1
δ A 1 ε 1 1 δ
which shows that θ 2
δ is a convex transformation of θ 1
δ , and hence, θ 2
δ represents more Knightian
uncertainty than θ 1
δ . Then, Theorem 2 shows that an increase in ε decreases the reservation
wage.
5. Lemmas and Proofs
Lemma 1. 0yδ is Wt -adapted.
Proof. This is immediate since for any t 0, yδ
t ∑
t
T 0wTχ fδ Tg cχ fδ tg and the components
in the right-hand side are all Wt-measurable.
Lemma 2. For any δ ∆ , it holds that
Iw0 δ
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z
Iw1 δ w1 dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
Proof. This holds because
Iw0 δ
lim
T!∞
yδ
0 β
Z
yδ
1 β
Z
yδ
T dθ dθ w0
lim
T!∞
yδ
0 β
Z
yδ
1 β
Z
yδ
T dθ dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
yδ
0 β
Z
yδ
1 β
Z
yδ
T dθ dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
lim
T!∞
w0 β
Z
w0 β
Z
w0dθ dθ w0 χ fδ 0g21
c β
Z
yδ
1 β
Z
yδ
T dθ dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
lim
T!∞
1 β T 1
1 β
w0 χ fδ 0g c β
Z
yδ
1 β
Z
yδ
T dθ dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β lim
T!∞
Z
yδ
1 β
Z
yδ
T dθ dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z
lim
T!∞
yδ
1 β
Z
yδ
T dθ dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z
Iw1 δ w1 dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
where the last equality but one holds by the monotone convergence theorem (Lemma A12).
Lemma 3. w0 W V w0 ∞
Proof. Let w0 W,a n dl e tδ and ˆ t be such that
δ β and t ˆ t Wt w0
1 t δ ¡1
Such δ and ˆ t exist by E2. Then,
V w0
lim
T!∞
c w0 β
Z
c 1
i 0wi dθ 0
w0 β T
Z Z
c T
i 0wi dθ 0
wT¡1 dθ 0
w0
lim
T!∞
W 0 w0 β W 1 w0 β TW T w0
lim
T!∞
W 0 w0 β W 1 w0 β
ˆ t¡1W
ˆ t¡1 w0 β
ˆ tδ ¡ˆ t β Tδ ¡T
W 0 w0 β W 1 w0 β
ˆ t¡1W
ˆ t¡1 w0
β δ
ˆ t
1 β δ
where the first inequality holds by Lemmas A2, A9 and A10. The last line of the whole
inequality is finite by E1 and the fact that δ β .
Lemma 4. BV ¡ V ¡,B V V , and for any admissible function V ,B Vi sa d m i s s i b l e .
Proof. The first claim holds because w0
BV ¡ w0 max
w0
1 β
c β
Z
V ¡ w1 θ w0 dw1
max
w0
1 β
c
1 β22
V ¡ w0
The secnd claim holds because w0
BV w0
max
w0
1 β
c β
Z
V w1 θ w0 dw1
max
w0
1 β
c β
Z
lim
T!∞
c w1 β
Z
c T
i 1wi dθ dθ w0
max
w0
1 β
lim
T!∞
c β
Z
c w1 β
Z
c T
i 1wi dθ dθ w0
max
w0
1 β
lim
T!∞
c w0 β
Z
c 1
i 0wi β
Z
c T
i 0wi dθ dθ w0
max
w0
1 β
V w0
V w0
where the third equality holds by the monotone convergence theorem (Lemma A12). The final
claim follows from the first two claims and the fact that BV BV 0 whenever V V 0.
Lemma 5. For any w0 W,
limt!∞ β t
ZZ Z
V wt dθ 0
wt¡1 dθ 0
w1dθ 0
w0 0
Proof. Let w0 W,a n dl e tδ and ˆ t be such that
δ β and t ˆ t Wt w0
1 t δ ¡1
Such δ and ˆ t exist by E2. Then, for any t ˆ t,
β t
Z Z
V wt dθ 0
wt¡1 dθ 0
w0
β t
Z Z
lim
T!∞
c wt β
Z
c 1
i 0wt i dθ 0
wt
β T
Z Z
c T
i 0wt i dθ 0
wt+T¡1 dθ 0
wt dθ 0
wt¡1 dθ 0
w0
lim
T!∞
β t
Z Z
c wt β
Z
c 1
i 0wt i dθ 0
wt
β T
Z Z
c T
i 0wt i dθ 0
wt+T¡1 dθ 0
wt dθ 0
wt¡1 dθ 0
w023
lim
T!∞
β t
Z Z
c t
i 0wi β
Z
c t 1
i 0wi dθ 0
wt
β T
Z Z
c t T
i 0 wi dθ 0
wt+T¡1 dθ 0
wt dθ 0
wt¡1 dθ 0
w0
lim
T!∞
β t
Z Z
c t
i 0wi dθ 0
wt¡1 dθ 0
w0 β t 1
Z Z
c t 1
i 0wi dθ 0
wt dθ 0
w0
β t T
Z Z
c t T
i 0 wi dθ 0
wt+T¡1 dθ 0
w0
lim
T!∞
β tWt w0 β t 1Wt 1 w0 β t TWt T w0
lim
T!∞
β tδ ¡t β t 1δ ¡ t 1 β t Tδ ¡ t T
β δ t
1 β δ
where the first inequality holds by Lemmas A2, A9 and A10; the first equality holds by the
monotone convergence theorem (Lemma A12); and the third inequality holds by Lemma A9.
The last line of the whole inequality converges to 0 as t ∞ by the fact that δ β .
Lemma 6. For any δ ∆ and for any admissible function V,
lim
t!∞ Iw0 δ
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z w1
1 β
χ fδ 1g c β
Z wt¡1
1 β
χ fδ t¡1g
c β
Z
V wt dθ wt¡1 χ fδ t¡1g dθ wt¡2 χ fδ 1g dθ w0 χ fδ 0g 0
Proof. By the iterative applications of Eq 17 ,w eh a v ef o ra n yt 0,
Iw0 δ
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z
Iw1 δ w1 dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z w1
1 β
χ fδ 1g
c β
Z
Iw2 δ
1w2 dθ w1 χ fδ 1g dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z w1
1 β
χ fδ 1g c β
Z wt¡1
1 β
χ fδ t¡1g
c β
Z
Iwt δ
1wt dθ wt¡1 χ fδ t¡1g dθ wt¡2 χ fδ 1g dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
Therefore, for any t 0,
Iw0 δ
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z w1
1 β
χ fδ 1g c β
Z wt¡1
1 β
χ fδ t¡1g24
c β
Z
V wt dθ wt¡1 χ fδ t¡1g dθ wt¡2 χ fδ 1g dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
β
Z w1
1 β
χ fδ 1g c β
Z wt¡1
1 β
χ fδ t¡1g
c β
Z
Iwt δ
1wt dθ wt¡1 χ fδ t¡1g dθ wt¡2 χ fδ 1g dθ w0
Z w1
1 β
χ fδ 1g c β
Z wt¡1
1 β
χ fδ t¡1g
c β
Z
V wt dθ wt¡1 χ fδ t¡1g dθ wt¡2 χ fδ 1g dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
β
Z
β
Z w2
1 β
χ fδ 2g β
Z wt¡1
1 β
χ fδ t¡1g
c β
Z
Iwt δ
1wt dθ wt¡1 χ fδ t¡1g dθ w1
Z w2
1 β
χ fδ 2g β
Z wt¡1
1 β
χ fδ t¡1g
c β
Z
V wt dθ wt¡1 χ fδ t¡1g dθ w1 χ fδ 1gdθ 0
w0χ fδ 0g
β
Z
β
Z
β
Z
Iwt δ
1wt V wt dθ 0
wt¡1χ fδ t¡1g dθ 0
w1χ fδ 1gdθ 0
w0χ fδ 0g
β t
ZZ Z
Iwt δ
1wt V wt χ fδ t¡1gdθ 0
wt¡1 dθ 0
w1dθ 0
w0
β t
ZZ Z
max Iwt δ
1wt χ fδ t¡1g V wt dθ 0
wt¡1 dθ 0
w1dθ 0
w0
β t
ZZ Z
V wt dθ 0
wt¡1 dθ 0
w1dθ 0
w0
where a series of inequalities in the middle holds by successive applications of Lemma A11, and
the last inequality holds by the admissibility of V. Finally, Lemma 5 completes the proof.
Lemma 7. Any admissible solution to Bellman’s equation is the value function.
Proof. Let V be any admissible solution to Bellman’s equation, and let w0 W.T h i sp a r a g r a p h
shows that V w0 Iw0 δ for any δ ∆ .L e tδ ∆ be any stopping rule. Then, that V solves
Bellman’s equation implies that for any t 0,
V w0
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z
V w1 dθ w0 χ fδ 0g25
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z w1
1 β
χ fδ 1g c β
Z
V w2 dθ w1 χ fδ 1g dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z w1
1 β
χ fδ 1g c β
Z wt¡1
1 β
χ fδ t¡1g
c β
Z
V wt dθ wt¡1 χ fδ t¡1g dθ wt¡2 χ fδ 1g dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
Hence, Lemma 6 proves the claim by the admissibility of V. This paragraph shows that there
exists a stopping rule δ ∆ such that V w0 Iw0 δ .L e tδ be the stopping rule such that for
all t 0, δ t as soon as
wt
1 β
c β
Z
W
V wt 1 θ wt dwt 1
holds; and δ t otherwise. Then, that V solves Bellman’s equation implies that for any t 0,
V w0
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z
V w1 dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z w1
1 β
χ fδ 1g c β
Z
V w2 dθ w1 χ fδ 1g dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
w0
1 β
χ fδ 0g c β
Z w1
1 β
χ fδ 1g c β
Z wt¡1
1 β
χ fδ t¡1g
c β
Z
V wt dθ wt¡1 χ fδ t¡1g dθ wt¡2 χ fδ 1g dθ w0 χ fδ 0g
Again, Lemma 6 proves the claim by the admissibility of V.
Lemma 8. Both of limn!∞ BnV ¡ and limn!∞ BnV are admissible solutions to Bellman’s
equation.
Proof. BnV ¡ is weakly increasing and BnV is weakly decreasing by Lemma 4, and hence,
the limits exist. Lemma 4 also shows that these limits are admissible. Finally, the limits solve
Bellman’s equation by the monotone convergence theorem (Lemma A12).
Proof of Theorem 1. The first half of the claim follows immediately from Lemmas 7 and 8.
The second half of the claim also follows immediately from the proof of Lemma 7.26
Proof of Corollary 1. It suffices to show that V ¤ is weakly increasing in w by the monotonicity
of θ and the definition of R. This, however, follows immediately from the facts that BV is
weakly increasing whenever so is V by the monotonicity of θ ,t h a tV ¡ is weakly increasing
(actually it’s constant), and that V ¤ limn!∞ BnV ¡.
Proof of Corollary 2. By the definition of the reservation wage, R is constant. Furhermore, R
satisfies the first equation because
R
1 β
c β
Z
W
V ¤ w θ dw
c β
Z ∞
0
θ w V ¤ w x dx
c β V ¤ R β
Z ∞
V ¤ R
θ w V ¤ w x dx
c β V ¤ R β
Z ∞
V ¤ R
θ w w 1 β x dx
c
β
1 β
R β
Z ∞
R 1¡β
θ w w 1 β x dx
c
β
1 β
R
β
1 β
Z ∞
R
θ w w x dx
where the first equality holds by the definition of R; the second equality holds by the definition
of Choquet integral; the third, fourth, and fifth equalities hold since V ¤ solves Bellman’s equation;
and the final equality holds by the change of variable. To show the second equality, note that
for almost all x,i th o l d st h a tθ w w x θ w w x (see the proof of Lemma A12).
Then, it follows that
Z ∞
R
θ w w x dx
Z ∞
R
θ w w x dx
Z ∞
R
θ w w x
c dx
Z ∞
R
1 1 θ w w x
c dx
Z ∞
R
1 θ 0 w w x dx27
Proof of Theorem 2. For each i 1 2, let Bi and V i¤ be the operator defined by 18 and the
value function corresponding to θ i. Then, V w
B2V w max
w
1 β
c β
Z
W
V w0 θ 2
w dw0
max
w
1 β
c β
Z
W
V w0 θ 1
w dw0
B1V w
where the inequality holds by Lemma A8 and 20 . Therefore, it follows that V 2¤ V 1¤ by
this, the fact that BiV 0 BiV whenever V 0 V,a n dt h a tV i¤ limn!∞ Bi nV ¡ by Lemmas 7
and 8. Finally, we conclude that w
R2 w 1 β c β
Z
W
V 2¤ w0 θ 2
w dw0
c β
Z
W
V 1¤ w0 θ 2
w dw0
c β
Z
W
V 1¤ w0 θ 1
w dw0
R1 w 1 β
where the first inequality holds by the remark made right before, and the second inequality holds
by Lemma A8 and 20 .
APPENDIX
This appendix provides some mathematics for the theory of Choquet capacity, which we
rely upon in the text. We omit the proof whenever it is easily available somewhere in the
literature (see, for example, Dellacherie (1970), Shapley (1971) and Schmeidler (1972, 1986)
among others).
Probability Capacity and Probability Charge Let S be a measurable space, where
is a σ -algebra on S.A probability capacity on S is a function θ : 0 1 which
satisfies
θ φ 028
θ S 1
and A B A B θ A θ B
A probability capacity is convex if
A B θ A B θ A B θ A θ B (21)
while it is concave if the inequality in 21 is reversed. A probability capacity is a probability
charge if the inequality in 21 holds with an equality.
A capacity θ is continuous from below if
Ai i A1 A2 A3 θ iAi lim
i!∞
θ Ai
A capacity θ is continuous from above if
Ai i A1 A2 A3 θ iAi lim
i!∞
θ Ai
A capacity θ is continuous if it is continuous both from below and from above. Note that
any finite measure is continuous, and that continuity and finite additivity (that is, 21 with the
inequality replaced by the equality) together imply countable additivity.
The conjugate of a probability capacity θ is the function θ 0 : 0 1 defined by
A θ 0 A 1 θ Ac
where Ac denotes the complement of A in S.T h ecore of a probability capacity θ ,c o r eθ ,i s
defined by
core θ P A P A θ A
where is the set of all probability charges on S . Note that a probability charge in the
core of a continuous capacity is countably additive and hence a probability measure.
Lemma A1. Given a probability measure P on S and a weakly increasing function f :
0 1 0 1 such that f 0 0 and f 1 1, define the function f P : 0 1 by
A f P A f P A
Then f P is a probability capacity. Furthermore, f P is concave (resp. convex, continuous)
when f is a concave (resp. convex, continuous) function.29
Lemma A2. Suppose θ is a probability capacity. Then θ is concave (resp. convex) if and only
if θ 0 is convex (resp. concave).
Lemma A3. If θ is a convex probability capacity, then core θ is non-empty.
Choquet Integral Let L S be the space of -measurable functions from S into ,
and let B S be the subspace of L S which consists of the bounded functions. Then, the
Choquet integral of u L S with respect to a probability capacity θ is defined by
Z
udθ
Z
S
u s θ ds
Z 0
¡∞
θ s u s x 1 dx
Z ∞
0
θ s u s x dx
unless the expression is ∞ ∞ .
Two functions u v L S are said to be co-monotonic if s t S u s u t v s
v t 0.
L e m m aA 4( M o n o t o n i c i t y ) .Let θ be a probability capacity. Then,
u v B S u v
Z
udθ
Z
vdθ
L e m m aA 5( P o s i t i v eH o m o g e n e i t y ) .Let θ be a probability capacity. Then
u B S a b
Z
a bu dθ a b
Z
udθ
where a in the left-hand side is understood to be a constant function.
Lemma A6. Let θ be a probability capacity. Then
u B S
Z
udθ 0
Z
udθ
Lemma A7 (Co-monotonic Additivity). Let θ be a probability capacity. If u v B S are
co-monotonic, then
Z
u v dθ
Z
udθ
Z
vdθ30
Lemma A8. If θ is a convex probability capacity, then
u B S
Z
udθ min
Z
udP P core θ
Lemma A9. If θ is a convex (resp. concave) probability capacity, then
u v B S
Z
u v dθ resp.
Z
udθ
Z
vdθ
Lemma A10. If θ is a convex probability capacity, then
u B S
Z
udθ
Z
udθ 0
Lemma A11. If θ is a convex probability capacity, then
u B S
Z
udθ
Z
vdθ
Z
u v dθ 0
Proof. This holds because
Z
udθ
Z
vdθ
Z
udθ
Z
v u u dθ
Z
udθ
Z
v u dθ
Z
udθ
Z
v u dθ
Z
u v dθ 0
Z
u v dθ 0
where the first inequality holds by Lemma A9, the third equality holds by Lemma A6, and the
last inequality holds by Lemma A4.
Lemma A12 (Monotone Convergence Theorem). (a) Let θ be a probability capacity which
is continuous from below and let un
∞
n 0 be a sequence of -measurable functions such that
u0 u1 u2 u3 and
R
u0dθ ∞ .T h e n ,
lim
n!∞
Z
undθ
Z
lim
n!∞ undθ31
(b) Let θ be a probability capacity which is continuous from above and let un
∞
n 0 be a
sequence of -measurable functions such that u0 u1 u2 u3 and
R
u0dθ ∞ . Then,
lim
n!∞
Z
undθ
Z
lim
n!∞ undθ
Proof. (b) follows from (a) if we let un and θ be un and θ 0 in (a). We thus prove only
(a). We first note that it holds that
θ u x θ u x
for almost all x. Obviously, θ u x θ u x holds for all x. On the other hand,
x θ u x is weakly decreasing in x, and hence, continuous in x except on at most
c o u n t a b l ym a n yp o i n t s .L e tx be a point at which x θ u x is continuous. Then,
θ u x lim
n!∞ θ u x 1 n θ u x
Therefore, (a) holds because
lim
n!∞
Z
undθ
lim
n!∞
Z 0
¡∞
θ un x 1 dx
Z ∞
0
θ un x dx
lim
n!∞
Z 0
¡∞
θ un x 1 dx
Z ∞
0
θ un x dx
Z 0
¡∞
lim
n!∞ θ un x 1 dx
Z ∞
0
lim
n!∞ θ un x dx
Z 0
¡∞
θ n un x 1 dx
Z ∞
0
θ n un x dx
Z 0
¡∞
θ limn!∞ un x 1 dx
Z ∞
0
θ limn!∞ un x dx
Z 0
¡∞
θ limn!∞ un x 1 dx
Z ∞
0
θ limn!∞ un x dx
Z
lim
n!∞ undθ
where the first and last equalities hold by the definition of the Choquet integral; the second
and sixth hold by the remark we have just made; the third holds by the Lebesgue monotone
convergence theorem; the fourth holds by θ ’s continuity from below; and the fifth holds by the
strict inequality defining the set.32
Note that by the monotone convergence theorem (Lemma A12), all of the above lemmas
concerning the Choquet integral hold true for any continuous capacity θ a n df o ra n yf u n c t i o n
u L S whenever the integral is well-defined.
Capacitary Kernel and Fubini Property Am a p p i n gθ : S 0 1 is a capacitary
kernel (from S to S)i fi ts a t i s f i e s
s S θ s is a probability capacity on S and
B θ ¢ B is -measurable.
In particular, if θ s is a probability measure for all s, θ is called stochastic kernel.
Lemma A13 (Fubini Property). Let θ be a capacitary kernel such that s θ s is continuous.
Then for any -measurable function u, the mapping
s
Z
u s s θ s ds
is -measurable.
Proof. Given E and s S,w ed e n o t eb yE s the s-section of E: E s s0 S s s0
E . We first prove that the mapping s θ s E s is -measurable for any E .D e f i n e
by
E s θ s E s is -measurable
Then the collection of finite disjoint unions of rectangles is a subfamily of because, if
E n
i 1 Ai Bi where Ai Bi and Ai Bi Aj Bj φ for i j,t h e n
θ s E s max
N0½f1 2 ng
θ s i2N0Bi I\i2N0Ai s
and the right-hand side is -measurable. It remains to show that is a monotone class. To this
end, let En
∞
n 1 and En E.T h e nEn s E s for any s S and limn!∞ θ s En s θ s E s
by the continuity of θ s ,w h i c hi m p l i e sE . The similar argument applies to decreasing
sequences. We now prove the theorem for the simple functions which is sufficient thanks to the
monotone convergence theorem (Lemma A12). Let u be a simple function on S S. Then, we33
can write u s s ∑
n
i 1aiχ Ei s s ,w h e r e0 a1 an, χ is the indicator function, and
Ei is a partition of S S. It follows that
s S
Z
u s s θ s ds
Z n
∑
i 1
aiχ Ei s s θ s ds
Z n
∑
i 1
aiχ Ei s s θ s ds
n
∑
i 1
ai ai¡1 θ s
n
k i Ek s
n
∑
i 1
ai ai¡1 θ s
n
k iEk s
where a0 0 and the third equality holds by the definition of Choquet integral. Then the claim
follows since the last expression is -measurable by the first paragraph.34
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